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When this note was slated for publication, the main case
law discussed was current. In 1996, Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc. successfully received a temporary restraining order
against the enforcement of section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, only to have it dissolved when
their request for a preliminary injunction was denied in 1997.
At that point in time, this note was written, considering the
constitutionality of section 505 on the merits, and ultimately
suggesting that section 505 be found unconstitutional. Once the
note was completed and awaiting publication, the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware fulfilled the author's
prophecy, declaring section 505 unconstitutional and
permanently enjoining its enforcement, in Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States of America, 30 F.
Supp. 2d 702 (1998). Then, on April 19, 1999, the United States
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, which was granted on June 21, 1999 (United
States, et al. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 98-1682,
order list 527 U.S. J.
Rather than drastically revise the note or scrap it entirely,
CoMM/ENT has opted to publish it "as is," since it accurately
predicts the outcome ultimately taken by the Delaware District
Court, and explores issues not fully addressed by the court in
their December 1998 decision. However, CoMM/ENT wishes to
advise its readers that the current state of the law is no longer
reflected by the case referred to in this note as "Playboy II."
Furthermore, the reader should be aware that the United States
Supreme Court will rule on this issue once and for all in the
year 2000.
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Introduction
What happens when parents come home from work to find
their children watching partially distorted images and
listening to crystal clear sounds of soft-core pornography on
the television? If they do not subscribe to the Playboy
Channel, or did not even realize that their cable provider made
it available, they write a letter to their Senator to complain. In
turn, the Senator introduces legislation like section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of' 1996,' which attempts to eliminate
the phenomenon of signal bleed from sexually explicit adult
channels.
This note argues that section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 should ultimately be found
unconstitutional. While Congress may have had good
intentions, section 505 is an example of irresponsible
legislation that imposes unnecessary economic burdens in an
ineffective manner. Furthermore, while Congress may have
identified a compelling government interest in protecting
children from sexually explicit adult programming, section
505 is certainly not the least restrictive means of preserving
that interest.
Part I of this note explores the inspiration behind section
505, including the phenomenon of signal bleed of cable
television signals. Part II then examines the history of section
505 through both its legislative history and the two United
States District Court decisions entitled Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc. v. United States.2 Part III analyzes the merits of the
constitutional challenges disposed of in the two Playboy
decisions. Part IV then looks at alternative means of
1. 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1997). Although the law is codified as section 561 of
Title 47 of the United States Code, this note will refer to the statute as "section
505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996" or "section 505," as it is referenced
in the relevant case law.
2. 918 F.Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1996), stay dissolved, 945 F.Supp. 772, affd,
520 U.S. 1141 (1996). The first case, 918 F.Supp. 813, in which a temporary
restraining order was granted against the enforcement of section 505, will be
referred to as "Playboy F' in this note. The subsequent case, 945 F.Supp. 772,
which dissolved the TRO and denied a motion for preliminary injunction, will be
referred to as "Playboy H."
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preventing signal bleed, further emphasizing the conclusion
that section 505 is not the least restrictive means of achieving
Congress' goal.
Ultimately, this note proposes that section 505 be found
unconstitutional and that the phenomenon of signal bleed of
sexually explicit programming be addressed by Congress
through other alternatives that are less constitutionally
offensive.
I
Factual History
A. Background behind section 505
Shortly after President Clinton signed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 into law, Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc. sought to have section 505
declared unconstitutional, filing for injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware.3 Graff
Pay-Per-View also filed a similar action, which was
consolidated into Playboy L' Two days before the law was to go
into effect, Playboy was granted its motion for a temporary
restraining order, preventing the enforcement of section 505
until its application for a preliminary injunction could be
heard.' That subsequent application for a preliminary
injunction was denied in Playboy 11.6
Section 505 in its current codified form provides the
following:
(a) Requirement. In providing sexually explicit adult
programming or other programming that is indecent on any
channel of its service primarily dedicated to sexually-
oriented programming, a multichannel video programming
distributor shall fully scramble or otherwise fully block the
video and audio portion of such channel so that one not a
subscriber to such a channel or programming does not
receive it.
3. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 772.
4. See 918 F.Supp. 813.
5. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 775.
6. See id.
504 [VOL. 21:501
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(b) Implementation. Until a multichannel video programming
distributor complies with the requirement set forth in
subsection (a) of this section, the distributor shall limit the
access of children to the programming referred to in that
subsection by not providing such programming during the
hours of the day (as determined by the Commission) when a
significant number of children are likely to view it.
(c) Definition. As used in this section, the term "scramble"
means to rearrange the content of the signal of the
programming so that the programming cannot be viewed or
heard in an understandable manner.
The Playboy II court refers to the "multichannel video
programming distributors" as "multisystem operators" or
"MSOs."8 The purpose behind requiring MSOs to fully
scramble sexually explicit adult programming was to eliminate
signal bleed.9
B. Signal Bleed
Signal bleed is described by the court as "the partial
reception of video images and/or audio sounds on a
scrambled channel." 0 It occurs when an MSO scrambles the
signal of a channel, but not effectively enough to make the
programming on the channel completely unintelligible. 1 The
effect of signal bleed has been described by one commentator
as giving "unsuspecting channel surfers two or three seconds
of flesh and groans before the screen goes quiet and
squiggly."12 This occurs because of a phenomenon called
random lockup, in which a scrambled signal may occasionally
appear clear for a moment before the visual image is
scrambled again.13 In Playboy I, the court inferred from the
record evidence "that the content of the audio signal that may
be heard is akin to the utterances of actress Meg Ryan during
7. 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1997).
8. Playboy H1, 945 F.Supp. at 776.
9. See ild.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 778.
12. Henry Goldblatt, Playboy's Complaint, FORTUNE, Oct. 27, 1997, at 264.
13. See Playboy 11, 945 F.Supp. at 778.
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her performance in the diner scene in the movie 'When Harry
Met Sally.' ' 4
The Playboy II court found that "the severity of this signal
bleeding problem varies from time to time and from place to
place. The reason for these inconsistencies may be weather
extremes, faulty or old equipment, or human error in
installing, operating, and/or maintaining systems." 5 The
technology available to consumers also plays a role in the
prominence of signal bleed. Older, non-cable ready televisions
require converter boxes in order to 'enable the cable subscriber
to view more than the traditional VHF and UHF channels.'"
Some generations of converter boxes have a feature called
channel mapping, which prevents signal bleed by not allowing
the box to tune in any signal at all on a scrambled channel. 7
Cable-ready televisions do not require a converter box, as
they are able to receive the multitude of channels an MSO
may provide.'8 However, the most modern of the cable-ready
televisions are so advanced, they can "make a discernible
picture out of a partly-scrambled signal."'" The Playboy II
court recognized the potential results that could come from
signal bleed. 'With this incidence of improved technology
and/or partially scrambled signals, a non-subscriber may see
and hear portions of a channel or program to which he or she
does not subscribe. This result is of particular concern when
the programming is sexually explicit, intended for an adult-
only audience."2 °
Similar concerns prompted Senator Diane Feinstein, a
California Democrat, and Senator Trent Lott, the current
Majority Leader from Mississippi, to introduce Amendment No.
1269 to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.21 Titled
"Scrambling of Sexually Explicit Adult Video Service
14. 918 F.Supp. at 822 n.ll.
15. 945 F.Supp. at 778.
16. See id. at 777 & n.1.
17. See id. at 778 & n.14.
18. Seeid. at 777 &n.11.
19. Id. at 778.
20. Id
21. See 141 CONG. REc. S8134- 01, S8166 (1995).
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Programming," the amendment emerged when the Senators
heard that parents were coming home from work to find their
children watching or listening to the adults-only channels
instead of watching cartoons.22 In Playboy II, anecdotal
evidence of such events included letters sent to other
members of Congress and affidavits from several parents
testifying about the signal bleed in their homes, and about
their children being exposed to signal bleed when they visit
their friends' homes. 23 Also admitted into evidence were video
and audio tape recordings made by non-subscribers of the
signal bleed from both the Playboy Channel and the Spice
Channel, which the court described as showing "partially
scrambled images of a nude woman caressing herself' and
"sounds of what appear to be repeated sexual encounters
accompanied by assorted orgiastic moans and groans,"
respectively. 24 There was, however, no concrete determination
made as to the precise number of occurrences or households
that are subjected to signal bleed.25
C. Cable Television
There are over fifty MSOs nationally, but the most
prominent are Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) and Time
Warner. 26 Each provider offers its subscribers various
packages of channels at varying monthly fees. 27 The least
expensive is a basic cable package, which usually includes
locally broadcast network channels, such as ABC, NBC, CBS,
Fox, WB, and UPN, in addition to public access channels,
news networks, and channels devoted to sports, music videos,
shopping, and education.25 MSOs also provide premium
channels, which may be packaged or available in addition to
the basic package, always entailing an additional monthly
22. Id.
23. See 945 F.Supp. at 778.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 779 & n. 16.
26. See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES, 631 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1997).
27. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 776.
28. See i/.
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fee.29 Premium channels include HBO, Cinemax, Showtime,
and the Movie Channel, which program recently released
motion pictures.3" Also considered premium channels are the
Playboy Channel and AdulTVision, both owned by the Playboy
Entertainment Group; and Adam & Eve and Spice, both
owned by Graff Pay-Per-View.31 Since all four channels
program virtually 100% sexually explicit adult programming,32
it is the signal bleed from channels like these that section 505
was designed to block.33
Some MSOs also offer premium programming on a pay-
per-view basis, in which the consumer places an order with
the MSO to receive access to a particular movie, program, or
sporting event for an additional fee.34 The MSO then, by
remote, temporarily unscrambles the signal of the channel the
pay-per-view program appears on at the scheduled time, and
then rescrambles the signal upon the conclusion of the
program.3 5 These scrambled signals also create the potential
for signal bleed. Both Playboy and Graff provide sexually
explicit pay-per-view programming.
36
The channels that MSOs provide to their subscribers
originate from signals sent out by programmers via satellite,
master antennas, and local broadcast television stations.37
Coaxial cable then carries the channels from the MSOs'
system transmitter to subscribers' homes, where the coaxial
cable is connected to either a cable-ready television, or to a
converter box, which in turn is connected to the television.38
Since the MSOs charge additional fees for premium channels
and pay-per-view programming, such signals are scrambled
by the MSOs in order to prevent non-subscribers from viewing
29. See d.
30. See d.
31. See id. at 777.
32. See id.
33. See 141 CONG. REC. S8134-01, S8167 (1995).
34. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 776.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 777.
37. See id.
38. See iA.
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them. 9 This is accomplished through "RF" technology, which
scrambles only the visual portion of the signal, or through
"baseband" technology, which scrambles both the visual and
audio signals."0
In order to ensure that a non-subscriber does not receive
a premium channel's signal, MSOs can use either "positive
trapping" or "negative trapping., 4' A positive trap is a metal
cylinder that a subscriber to a premium channel would attach
to his television in order to unscramble the premium
channel.42 This requires the MSO to scramble that channel at
its system transmitter, meaning that all non-subscribers will
receive the channel in its scrambled form.43 A negative trap
works conversely, with the MSO sending the premium channel
out to all homes unscrambled, and then installing the negative
trap on non-subscribers' televisions in order to scramble the
premium channel in their homes.44 The Playboy II court
recognized that while MSOs have a choice of method to use,
positive trapping is usually more cost effective when the
majority of homes do not subscribe to the premium channel.45
In 1996, the Playboy Channel was available as a pay-per-
view channel to 11.2 million homes, an increase from the prior
year by 200,000.46 However, 400,000 homes were given new
access to the channel on a 24-hour per day basis, bringing the
total of such households to 4.5 million, some of which overlap
with the 11.2 million pay-per-view homes.47 By 1997, Playboy
cable programming was available to approximately 21 million
households, with about 5 million of those households
receiving the programming from direct broadcast satellite
services.48 Taking into account income from cable and direct
39. See id.
40. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 777.
41. See id. at 778.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Playboy H1, 945 F.Supp. at 778.
46. See Gene G. Marcial, Why Playboy is Hot Again, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 24,
1997, at 122.
47. See id.
48. See Brooks Boliek, Playboy: Net's freedom should apply to cable, THE
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broadcast satellite services, financial analysts found the
Playboy Channel's income on the upswing, doubling from $9
million in 1996 to perhaps $20 million in 1998.49
The Playboy II court's findings indicate that of all the
homes to which the programming is made available, three
million households subscribe to and/or purchase pay-per-
view sexually explicit adult programming." The court
determined that of the approximately 62 million homes that
receive cable in the United States,. 20 to 25 million have the
converter boxes that use channel, mapping to eliminate the
possibility of signal bleed.5' However, the court was unable to
determine how many of the remaining 40 million households
would be subject to signal bleed, due to the fact that there
would be no signal bleed where the MSOs already effectively
scramble their premium channels, or where the households
actually subscribe to the premium channels. 2 Since this
action was at the preliminary injunction stage, the court
stated, "[i]f at the trial on the permanent injunction more
specific evidence of the number of households with potential
for signal bleed were to be presented, we would be in a better
position to consider whether the standards for a permanent
injunction have been met."5 3
It is also necessary to consider that sexually explicit adult
programs also appear on other premium channels which are
not primarily devoted to programming 100% adult content.54
Evidence received by the Playboy II court indicated that on a
Friday evening, one-sixteenth the number of such programs
available on the sexually explicit channels was also available
on non-sexually explicit channels. 5 The court also noted that
the R-rated movies shown on the non-sexually explicit
channels "contained some sexually explicit scenes but were
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, July 24, 1997.
49. See id.
50. See Playboy H, 945 F.Supp. at 777.
51. See . at 779.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 779 n.16.
54. See i. at 777.
55. See id.
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not continuously sexually explicit" as are the programs on the
Playboy Channel and Spice.56
Legislative History and Case Law
A. Section 505
In order to comply with section 505, MSOs that do not
currently effectively scramble their sexually explicit adult
programming channels have two alternatives. Section 505(a)
provides the first, mandating that such channels be scrambled
"so that the programming cannot be viewed or heard in an
understandable manner."57 The second alternative, contained
within section 505(b), requires that until the MSO complies
with section 505(a), it shall not provide "such programming
during the hours of the day when.., a significant number of
children are likely to view it," 58 a practice commonly known as
time channeling.5 9 The Federal Communications Commission
set that period to be from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.6 °
The requirement set 'forth in section 505(a), dubbed
"complete scrambling" by the Playboy II court,61 can be fulfilled
by MSOs in a number of ways. 2 One is to provide
nonsubscribers with a lockbox 3 A lockbox allows both the
audio and video portions of the signal to be fully scrambled
when the subscriber chooses. 64 For example, when parents do
not want their children viewing a certain channel, they may
turn and remove the key from the lockbox, blocking that
channel's signal until the parent uses the key to unlock it. The
court found that because most lockboxes are only capable of
blocking signals to the television set to which the lockbox is
56. Playboy H1, 945 at 777.
57. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a), (c) (1997).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 561(b).
59. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 774.
60. See id.
61. Id at 780.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 781.
64. See i.
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attached, each television set connected to cable would need to
have a lockbox attached in order to bring that MSO under
compliance with section 505(a).65 Lockboxes also are only
effective when used with a converter box that features channel
mapping.6 Therefore, the cost per household for an MSO to
distribute a lockbox and converter box to all nonsubscribers
would be approximately $1 15.67 The Playboy II court described
the total cost as "prohibitive, probably in excess of one billion
dollars.
68
Another way MSOs can completely scramble their sexually
explicit channels is by providing negative traps to
nonsubscribers.6 9 As described earlier, attaching a negative
trap to a nonsubscriber's television acts to scramble the signal
that is sent out by the MSO unscrambled.7 ° While the cost per
household would be around $15, the court noted that using
negative traps would be "an economically feasible solution
only in areas, such as military bases, where a large majority of
cable subscribers want to receive the adult channel."'
A third alternative is to use positive traps to achieve
"double scrambling."72 In addition to the traditional RF or
baseband scrambling, the signal of the adult channel would
be completely jammed by the MSO, so that no signal bleed
would occur in any cable subscriber's home. 73 Then,
subscribers to the adult channel are provided with a converter
box and a positive trap, which act together to unscramble the
RF or baseband scrambling and the jamming signal,
respectively. 74 The Playboy II court favored this method as "the
most workable," as the positive traps average $7 per television
and the additional jamming equipment would cost the MSO
65. See Playboy H1, 945 at 78 1.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Playboy H, 945 at 781.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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approximately $750 to $100.75 However, while the court
noted that the positive trap can either be installed by the
subscriber for free or installed by the MSO for around $35, it
failed to consider the additional cost of providing the converter
boxes.7
While the positive trap alternative may be the most cost-
effective, it also has its share of drawbacks. For example, pay-
per-view purchases are traditionally spontaneous, where the
viewer orders the program shortly before it begins 7 If the
positive trap alternative was used by the MSO, a subscriber
would have to pick up or order the positive trap well in
advance of viewing the program, impinging upon the
spontaneity normally associated with watching such
programs. In Playboy II, the plaintiffs claimed that their
revenues had dropped by 50% for the MSOs who already use
positive traps to scramble adult programming, suggesting that
"the impulse nature of purchasing adult programming" was a
significant factor in the loss of revenue. 9
If an MSO does not wish to adopt any of the above
alternatives, it may choose instead to comply with section
505(b), the time channeling requirement."' The FCC set the
safe harbor period for sexually explicit adult programming
between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m."' Essentially,
for an MSO to comply with section 505(b), it would only be
able to make the sexually explicit adult channels available
during that eight-hour period.
B. Playboy I and H
In March 1996, the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, in Playboy I, granted a temporary
75. See d.
76. See Ad.
77. See Playboy II, 945 at 781.
78. See Ad.
79. Id. at 782.
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1997).
81. See In re Implementation of Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, CS Dkt. No. 96-40, FCC 96-84, Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
amending 47 C.F.R. § 76 T 6 (released March 5, 1996; intended to become
effective March 9, 1996).
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restraining order preventing the United States from
implementing or enforcing section 505.82 The temporary
restraining order was then dissolved in Playboy H, which
denied Playboy's and Graffs applications for a preliminary
injunction.83 In denying the preliminary injunction, the court
considered whether the plaintiffs (1) would be likely to succeed
on the merits, (2) whether they will suffer irreparable harm if
not granted relief, (3) if that harm would be outweighed by any
harm that may result to the defendants if the injunctive relief
is granted, and (4) whether the injunctive relief is in the public
interest.84 Those four factors were also considered by the
Playboy I court, which granted the plaintiffs the temporary
restraining order preventing the enforcement of section 505.85
Playboy and Graff challenged the constitutionality of
section 505 with three claims: violation of the First
Amendment freedom of speech; violation the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause; and void-for-
vagueness.86 In Playboy I, strict scrutiny was applied in
considering whether the case would succeed on the merits,
with the court framing the review as whether or not section
505 "represents the least restrictive means of achieving the
Government's interest ... to ensure that minors do not have
access to non-subscribed. adult programming on cable
television."8 7 Referring to Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC,88 the court indicated that indecent speech, such as
the sexually explicit programming targeted by section 505,
may be regulated by the Government "in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
82. See 918 F.Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1996), stay dissolved, 945 F.Supp. 772,
affd, 520 U.S. 1141.
83. See 945 F.Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1996).
84. See id. at 783 (citing American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp.
824, 851 (E.D.Pa. 1996)).
85. See Playboy I, 918 F.Supp. at 820.
86. See Playboy H, 945 F.Supp. at 774-75. The merits of the free speech and
equal protection claims will be further discussed in the Part Ill, infra. The
vagueness challenge will not be considered since the author agrees with the
Playboy II court that Playboy has "little-to-no chance of succeeding on the merits
of a vagueness claim." 945 F.Supp. at 791.
87. 918 F.Supp. at 820.
88. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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further the articulated interest."89 In Sable, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that "protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors" is a compelling
government interest." The Supreme Court also emphasized
that the means designed to achieve such compelling interests
must be narrowly tailored."
1. Free Speech
The Playboy I court concluded that there was serious
doubt as to whether section 505 was the least restrictive
means to address the government's interest, and thus found
that a likelihood of success on the merits had been
demonstrated by the plaintiffs.92 The main reason for the
court's doubt that section 505 was not the least restrictive
means was its opinion that alternative technologies should be
further investigated before implementing the law.93 Those
investigations were supposedly accomplished in Playboy II,
where the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success if any of their claims were
litigated on the merits.94
The court's change of heart between Playboy I and Playboy
II was inspired in large part by the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC (hereinafter "Denver Consortium") 9
The statutory provisions at issue in Denver Consortium sought
to regulate sex-related material broadcast on cable channels
that fell into the categories of "leased access channels" and
"public, educational, or governmental channels."96 The Playboy
89. Id. at 126.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See 918 F.Supp. at 821.
93. See id. The alternative technologies investigated in Playboy II included
lockboxes, double-scrambling using positive traps, and negative trapping. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
94. See 945 F.Supp. at 783.
95. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
96. Denver Consortium involved challenges to the sections 10(a), 10(b), and
10(c) of the Cable Act of 1992. See id. at 732. Section 10(a) "permits a cable
operator to enforce prospectively a written and published policy of prohibiting
1999]
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H court pointed out the contrast between the types of channels
dealt with in Denver Consortium and in the Playboy cases,
noting that, "[unlike leased and public access channels, the
Graff and Playboy networks are commercial premium
channels."97
In Denver Consortium, the Supreme Court found section
10(b) of the Cable Act of 1992 unconstitutional, while a
plurality found sections 10(a) and 10(c) valid.98 However, most
relevant to the court in Playboy II was the commentary
gleaned from Denver Consortium concerning the level of
scrutiny to be applied to such challenges, as the Playboy II
court decided that it "should apply either strict scrutiny or
something very close to strict scrutiny."99 This decision was
based on the Playboy II court's interpretation of Justice
Breyer's statement in Denver Consortium in which he summed
up the Supreme Court's history of First Amendment
jurisprudence by saying, "Congress may not regulate speech
except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of
a degree of care that we have not elsewhere required.""°0 The
Playboy II court also decided that section 505 should be
treated as a content-based restriction on speech, since
Congress intended it to apply only to signal bleed of sexually
explicit programming.10'
In addition, the Playboy I court decided to take into
account the context of the sexually explicit content, noting
programming that the operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by
contemporary community standards," while section 10(b) requires MSOs that do
not ban sexually explicit programming under section 10(a) to instead completely
segregate and block the signal carrying such programming. Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 1486, §§ 10(a),(b)
(1999). Section 10(c) is similar to section 10(a), except that it applies to public,
educational, or government channels, as opposed to the leased access channels
targeted by section 10(a). See id. at § 10(c).
97. 945 F.Supp. at 784 n.23.
98. See 518 U.S. at 733
99. 945 F.Supp. at 784.
100. Id. at 785 (quoting Denver Consortium, 518 U.S. at 740). Despite the fact
that Denver Consortium overturned a cable regulation, the Playboy II court used
the Supreme Court's discussion of applicable scrutiny levels in Denver
Consortium to uphold the cable regulations of section 505.
101. See id.
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that the Supreme Court has found cable television to be as
accessible to children as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more
so." °2 This finding contributed to the Playboy II court's
determination that protecting children from sexually explicit
material is a compelling government interest, a conclusion
which was not disputed by any party in the suit. 10 3 The
Playboy II court then concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
show that they would be likely to succeed on the merits of
their free speech claim, based on the conclusion that section
505 "is an acceptable governmental response intended to
prevent exposure of minors to sexually explicit
programming."' 4  However, an "acceptable response" is
different from the "least restrictive means," and thus the
Playboy II court may have reached the wrong conclusion.
2. Equal Protection
Likewise, the court in Playboy II was also not persuaded
that the plaintiffs' equal protection claim would succeed on
the merits.10 5 Playboy and Graff claimed that section 505
denied them equal protection of the law because it is directed
only at channels which program 100% sexually explicit
programming, thus allowing other premium channels, like
HBO and Showtime, to program the same sexually explicit
programming, so long as it is mixed in with non-sexually
explicit programming. 06 In stating that "[the cause of the
problem was primarily traced to sex-dedicated networks and,
understandably, Congress began its efforts to address the
problem by focusing on those networks," the Playboy II court
concluded that there was no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.' Because the government's discrimination in section
505 does not involve a suspect class, the Playboy II court used
102. See id. (citing Denver Consortium 518 U.S. at 744).
103. See id at 788.
104. Id. at 790.
105. See Playboy 11, 945 at 790.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 791.
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the permissive rational basis scrutiny in considering Playboy's
equal protection claim."°8
In regard to whether irreparable harm would be suffered
by Playboy and Graff if injunctive relief was denied, the
Playboy I court noted that "the requisite harm is established
where the plaintiff shows that an act of Congress has 'a
chilling effect on free expression."" 9 The Playboy II court,
however, never specifically addressed the irreparable harm
consideration, since it felt that if the only irreparable harm
suffered by plaintiffs would be the loss of First Amendment
freedoms, a finding that section 505 did not violate those
freedoms meant irreparable harms need not be considered." 10
The Playboy I court decided that if the temporary
restraining order was not granted, practically all MSOs
affected by section 505 would be forced to comply with section
505(b), the time channeling alternative."' This was due to a
combination of the costs involved with complying with the
complete scrambling requirement, as well as the additional
labor time such compliance would require."12 Acknowledging
that the FCC had set the time channeling period between
10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., the Playboy I court stated that
"such a substantial reduction of viewing time will cause
significant financial losses for both the cable companies and
Playboy."" 3
The Playboy I court also found that the Untied States had
failed to demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm if
the relief is granted.' 14 The court stated that "there is an
absolute void of legislative findings that section 505 is
necessary to protect minors from exposure to sexually
oriented material shown on adult cable channels which their
108. See i. at 791 n.31.
109. Playboy I, 918 F.Supp. at 821 (citing American Civil Liberties Union v.
Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996)).
110. See 945 F.Supp. at 783.
111. See918F.Supp. at821.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 821-22.
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parents have chosen not to subscribe to.""5 Specifically, the
Playboy I court noted that "the legislative record contains no
findings as to how often this bleeding occurs, how many
minors are exposed to the adult programming when the
bleeding occurs or what. effect such exposure has on
minors.""' Thus, in weighing the irreparable harm on both
sides, the Playboy I court concluded that the potential harm to
the plaintiffs substantially outweighed any harm the
defendants would suffer if temporary injunctive relief was not
granted."7
As for the impact upon the public interest, the Playboy I
court concluded that granting a temporary injunction would
simply maintain the status quo, and thus would not harm the
public interest."8 Again, Playboy II never reached this
consideration, as it quit its analysis once it decided the free
speech claim lacked a likelihood of success."9
C. Other Legislation
There are two other statutes which are also designed to
completely block the signals from undesired cable channels: 1)
section 544(d) of the 1984 Cable Act; 20 and 2) section 504 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.121
Section 544(d) of the 1984 Cable Act provides, in pertinent
part, the following:
(2) In order to restrict the viewing of programming which is
obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a
cable .operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by
which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular
cable service during periods selected by that subscriber.
(3)(A) If a cable operator provides a premium channel
without charge to cable subscribers who do not subscribe to
115. Id. at 822.
116. Id.
117. See Playboy I, 918 F.Supp. at 822.
118. See id.
119. See Playboy H, 945 F.Supp. at 108.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (1997).
121. 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1998). Although the law is codified as section 560 of
Title 47 of the United States Code, this note will refer to the statute as "Section
504 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996" or "section 504," as it is referenced
in the relevant case law.
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such premium channel, the cable operator shall, not later
than 30 days before such premium channel is provided
without charge-
(i) notify all cable subscribers that the cable operator plans
to provide a premium channel without charge;
(ii) notify all cable subscribers when the cable operator plans
to offer a premium channel without charge;
(iii) notify all cable subscribers that they have a right to
request that the channel carrying the premium channel be
blocked; and
(iv) block the channel carrying the premium channel upon
the request of a subscriber.
Clearly, section 544(d)(2) was designed to accomplish the
same task as section 505, but in a much less restrictive
manner. Furthermore, Subsections 544(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv) could
easily be construed to apply to not only the providing of a
premium channel free of charge, but also to the signal bleed of
such a channel.
Section 504 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
provides, "(a) SUBSCRIBER REQUEST. -- Upon request by a
cable service subscriber, a cable operator shall, without
charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully block the audio and
video programming of each channel carrying such
programming so that one not a subscriber does not receive
it."'23 In Playboy II, the court articulated that "[tihe main
difference is that under section 504 the household has to
request the box, while under section 505 the MSO must
provide the box.' 24 In a footnote following that statement, the
court noted that elsewhere in the Telecommunications Act,
Congress identifies "a compelling government interest in
empowering parents to control the television viewing by their
children" by providing them with the ability to voluntarily
block programming they believe their children should not
watch, as section 504 seeks to do. 
25
However, the Playboy II court went on to characterize
section 504 as "an adjunct of lesser efficacy because its
122. 47 U.S.C. § 540.
123. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 504, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996).
124. 945 F.Supp. at 789.
125. Id. at 789 n.28.
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exercise requires knowledge and the taking of affirmative steps
such as requesting the blocking device from the MSO." 26 The
Playboy II court's main problem with section 504 was the lack
of evidence that parents were aware that section 504 afforded
them the opportunity to have undesired channels blocked at
no additional cost. 12 7 It was in turn pointed out by the court
that there was a lack of evidence that MSOs or providers like
Playboy were advertising the availability of such boxes. 28
III
Constitutional Analysis
A. Free Speech
The treatment of the free speech claim in Playboy II was
cursory at best. While the court put forth effort in determining
that the level of scrutiny should be "something very close to
strict, " 129 and that protecting children from sexually explicit
programming was a compelling government interest,'30 the
Playboy II court did not do an adequate job of determining
whether section 505 was "carefully tailored to serve" the
compelling government interest, as it stated it would.
31
Instead of first addressing whether the complete
scrambling provision of section 505(a) was narrowly tailored,
the Playboy II court acknowledged that "[tihere is undoubtedly
a substantial expense in complying with subsection (a)." 132
However, it quickly dismissed those economic concerns by
stating, "economics alone cannot dictate the result where
constitutional rights are at issue.' 33 The Playboy II court then
determined that even if the expenses incurred in complying
with section 505(a) would make it unconstitutional, that
126. Id.
127. See id. at 789.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 784.
130. See Playboy H1, 945 at 786.
131. Id. at 787.
132. Id. at 788.
133. Id. (quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78
(1976)(Powell, J., concurring)).
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should not matter because the alternative, section 505(b)'s
time-channeling, was found to be constitutional.'34 However,
there is arguably a flaw in the court's conclusion that, "if the
time-channeling alternative provides a constitutional means of
compliance with section 505, then section 505 is
constitutional."' 35
The main problem arises with the Playboy II court's
justification of the time-channeling provision in section 505(b)
by relying on the Supreme Court's holding in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.36 In Playboy I, the court states, "[b]ecause the
Supreme Court endorsed a time-channeling solution [in very
similar circumstances] in Pacifica Foundation, we believe that
time-channeling also survives constitutional scrutiny here.' 3
However, the circumstances in the Pacifica case are
distinguishable from the situation surrounding section 505.
First of all, the time-channeling requirement in Pacifica
applied to a radio broadcast of patently offensive material,' 38
which is distinguishable from the distribution of a cable signal
of sexually explicit programming. One distinction is that radio
signals travel through the airwaves, allowing anyone with a
radio to receive the programming, '3 whereas the signal bleed
addressed in section 505 is only available to those households
which subscribe to an MSO that carries sexually explicit adult
premium channels.' 40 The patently offensive speech in Pacifica,
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monolgue,' 4 ' could be heard by
anyone with a functioning radio within Pacifica Foundation's
broadcast area. That includes individuals listening at home, at
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
137. Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 789.
138. See Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 729.
139. See idL at 731.
140. See Playboy II, 945 F.Supp. at 774.
141. The patently offensive speech in Pacifica was satiric humorist George
Carlin's 12 minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words," in which he refers to his
thoughts about seven words usually not allowed to be said over the airwaves.
See 438 U.S. at 729. On October 30, 1973 at approximately 2 p.m., it was
broadcast by a New York radio owned by Pacifica Foundation, and was heard by
a man driving in his car with his young son, who later filed a complaint with the
FCC that culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Pacifica. See id.
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work, or even in an automobile, as was the individual was who
filed the original complaint with the FCC that led to the
Pacifica decision.'42 Thus, a very large portion of the 272
million people in the United States'4 3 could potentially access
such broadcasts, since it is estimated that there are over 540
million functioning radios in the United States. 144
In contrast, the signal bleed from the sexually explicit
programming that is targeted by section 505 can only be
received by less than 40 million households. 145 Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court's decision to
allow time-channeling in Pacifica is distinguishable from the
Playboy II court approving of the time-channeling alternative
in section 505(b). Had Pacifica involved a much more limited
number of potential unwanted exposures, as is the case with
signal bleed, the Supreme Court may have decided not to
endorse time-channeling. Furthermore, the majority opinion
in Pacifica was criticized by Justice Brennan who wrote, "it
ignores the constitutionally protected interests of both those
who wish to transmit and those who desire to receive
broadcasts that many- including the FCC and this Court-
might fred offensive." 146 Similarly, the Playboy II court failed to
adequately take into account the impact section 505 has on
the rights of providers of and subscribers to sexually explicit
adult programming.
The Supreme Court in Pacifica also emphasized the
narrowness of its holding, as Justice Stevens' opinion for the
Court indicated that time of day, content of the program, and
the differences between radio and television are all relevant
variables when considering time-channeling under the
rationale of nuisance. 147 Yet, the Playboy II court concluded
142. See id. at 730.
143. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Monthly estimates of the United States
Population (last modified June 4, 1999) available at <http://www.census.gov/
populatlon/estimates/natlon/intfile l-l .txt>, (last visited June 14, 1999).
144. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACT BOOK 1996, (1992
estimated number of radios) available at <http: //www.odci.gov/
cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/us.htm> (last visited Nov. 2, 1998)
145. See Playboy 11, 945 F.Supp. at 779.
146. 438 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
147. See438 U.S. at 750.
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that, compared to the thought of a child hearing Carlin's filthy
words in Pacifica, the idea of a child being exposed to the
sights and sounds of sexually explicit programming via signal
bleed was "even more troublesome."'" Yet, no deference was
given to contrasts between the two cases in terms of the
numbers of potential children involved or the innate
differences between a free radio broadcast and subscription-
based cable signal bleed.
Furthermore, it seems irresponsible for the Playboy II
court to uphold section 505 simply because it feels at least
half of it is constitutional. The court actually stated that "even
if section 505(a) does not pass constitutional analysis, section
505(b) does.' 49 In the context of a hearing for a preliminary
injunction, perhaps such analysis is allowable. But if this
issue was truly being decided on its merits, that holding
appears to be more of a cop-out than a conclusion of law.
Instead of making the flawed conclusion that the plaintiffs
were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their free speech
claim, the Playboy II court should have followed something
closer to the decision in Playboy I. In that decision, the court
heeded the argument that there were substantially less
restrictive means available to serve the government's
compelling interest. 50 While the court in Playboy I supposedly
followed the suggestion of the Playboy I court by exploring
these alternative means before concluding whether section
505 was constitutional, it appears that the Playboy II decision
ignored its record of evidence and instead relied on Pacifica to
justify section 505(b) and then, in turn, relied on section
505(b) to justify section 505(a). It seems apt to conclude, as
the Playboy I court stated, "[b]ecause of the obvious
importance of First Amendment guarantees .... further
investigation is needed to properly examine the Playboy
programming and the feasibility of using alternative
technologies prior to permitting the implementation of section
148. 945 F.Supp. at 788.
149. Id at 789.
150. See Playboy 1, 918 F.Supp. at 821.
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505."'5' Since the Playboy II court failed in that task, such an
investigation takes place in Part IV of this note.
B. Equal Protection
The Playboy II court's essential argument against finding a
violation of equal protection relied upon the Supreme Court's
treatment of a similar challenge in Denver Consortium. 52 In
Denver Consortium, Justice Breyer wrote for the majority that,
"Congress need not deal with every problem at once."15 3 In
support of this statement, Justice Breyer cited Semler v.
Oregon Bd. Of Dental Examiners,5 4 which stood for the
principle that Congress need not "strike at all the evils at the
same time."' In turn, the Playboy II court cited Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla.,5 6 which is famous for contributing the
"one step at a time" doctrine,15 7 and United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.,156 in which the Supreme Court decided that
it could not "require that the Government make progress on
every front before it can make progress on any front."'59
However, while all these cases support the idea that statutes
which target only some of the causes of a compelling
government interest can be valid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, section 505 is
distinguishable from the scenarios in those cases.
For section 505 not to violate Playboy's and Graffs equal
protection rights, the statute would need to cover all premium
channels that program any sexually explicit adult
programming, regardless of the ratio of such programming to
non-sexually explicit programming. In other words, section
505 would not violate the Equal Protection Clause if it simply
required the signal bleed from all premium channels to be
151. Id.
152. 945 F.Supp. at 790.
153. Denver Consortium, 518 U.S. at 757.
154. 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935).
155. Id.
156. 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
157. Id.
158. 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993).
159. Id., cited in Playboy II, 945 at 791.
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blocked, instead of the signal bleed of only the adult channels.
There is also no technical reason for limiting the regulation of
section 505 to only sexually explicit channels, as the
technology necessary to block all premium channels is the
same that would be used block only the adult channels.
In contrast, Semler addressed a statute that regulated
misleading advertising among dentists, which Semler
challenged as an equal protection violation because it did not
extend to the regulation of misleading advertising by other
professionals. 60 The Court found that there was no violation,
as the Oregon legislature was permitted to deal with different
professions individually.' 6' Likewise, in Lee Optical, the
Supreme Court allowed the Oklahoma legislature to address
the problem of consumers obtaining eye glasses without first
obtaining a prescription from an optometrist by prohibiting
opticians from making the glasses without receiving a
prescription."2 When it was argued by the opticians that
drugstores and other sellers of "ready-to-wear" eyeglasses were
not being prohibited from supplying eyeglasses without
prescriptions, the Court reasoned that the legislature "may
take one step at a time" in addressing the problem.'63
The difference between those cases and the equal
protection claim brought by Playboy and Graff is that applying
section 505 to all premium channels is much simpler than
trying to regulate the advertising of all professionals or pass a
law that targets opticians and all other suppliers of eyeglasses.
If addressing the problems in Semler and Lee Optical were as
easy as it would be to block the signal bleed of all premium
channels, then the Playboy I court's conclusion that there is
no violation of equal protection would be strengthened.
However, it appears that, at the minimum, Playboy and Graff
were capable of showing that they may be able to succeed on
the merits of their equal protection claim.
160. See294 U.S. at 610.
161. Seetd.at610-11.
162. See 348 U.S. at 489.
163. Id.
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IV
Alternatives and Further Analysis
A. Denver Consortium Construed Differently
Since the Playboy II court put such great emphasis on the
Supreme Court's decision in Denver Consortium, it is
interesting that Denver Consortium also provides support by
analogy for the notion that the impact on the spontaneity of
pay-per-view purchases of sexually explicit adult programs
may lead to a loss of revenue if positive traps are used by
MSOs to comply with section 505. In Denver Consortium, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that a provision which required
an MSO to unblock a specific channel upon the subscriber's
written request, and then reblock the channel also upon
written request, would mean "that a subscriber cannot decide
to watch a single program without considerable advance
planning" and that programmers would be prevented "from
broadcasting to viewers who select programs day by day (or,
through 'surfing,' minute by minute)."164 While section 505 is
admittedly distinguishable, the Supreme Court felt that the
restrictions found in the provision in Denver Consortium
supported a finding that the provision was unconstitutional,
as it was not the least restrictive means for the government to
meet its compelling interest.165 That same argument can also
be applied to section 505, since the use of positive traps was
suggested by the Playboy IIcourt as the most feasible means
of compliance. 6
The Denver Consortium Court also touched on the notion
that economically burdensome cable regulations like those
mentioned above may have a chilling effect on the
programming MSOs choose to provide. The Supreme Court
stated, "[The added costs and burdens that these
requirements impose upon a cable system operator may
encourage that operator to ban programming that the operator
164. 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996).
165. See id.
166. See Playboy H, 945 F.Supp. at 778.
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would otherwise permit to run, even if only late at night."1 67
Likewise, it is not difficult to predict that if some MSOs find
compliance with section 505(a) to be too expensive, and that
compliance with section 505(b) will result in a decrease in
revenue, choosing to stop carrying any sexually explicit
channels is the logical outcome. Section 505 then, in effect,
would act to deprive all adults of such programming, simply
because an unidentified number of children may or may not
have been exposed to the signal bleed of such programming.
As one commentator analogized the situation, "the state
demands that children ride in car seats, but it does not
require auto manufacturers to equip every car with such seats
on the chance that a child might be a passenger." 68 Section
505, therefore, does not appear to be the most narrowly
tailored means for protecting children from adult
programming.
B. Less Restrictive Means
Less restrictive alternatives discussed in Denver
Consortium parallel the alternatives to section 505. Section
544(d) of the 1984 Cable Act (requiring MSOs to provide
lockboxes upon request) was characterized by the Government
in Denver Consortium as less effective than programming
regulations because it requires parents to discover that the
lockboxes exist, learn how to obtain one from their MSO, and
then spend time learning how to use it. 169 While the Supreme
Court admitted to having to "assume the accuracy" of the
Government's statement, it went on to suggest that certain
provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 may better
deal with the 1984 provision's ineffectiveness than the
provision it struck down in Denver Consortium.
70
Of course, the two provisions from the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 the Supreme Court referred
167. Denver Consortium, 518 U.S. at 754.
168. James R. Petersen, Scrambled: The Supreme Court Got Its Signals
Crossed, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1997, at 51. Incidentally, it was this article that inspired
the topic of this note.
169. See 518 U.S. at 758-59.
170. See id.
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to were sections 504 and 505.7 However, while the Court was
quick to point out that that sections 504 and 505 were less
restrictive that the provision at issue in Denver Consortium, it
also stated that the constitutionality of sections 504 and 505
was not before it.'
As for section 504, it is definitely less restrictive than
section 505, and theoretically could be the means to meet the
Government's compelling interest in protecting children from
signal bleed of sexually explicit programming. Criticisms of
section 504 are no more strongly supported than those of
section 505. The Playboy II court's worry about section 504
not being effective because a child could view the unblocked
signal bleed at a neighbor's house is easily defeated by the
proposal that the same friend's parents might actually
subscribe to the channel, meaning the children would be no
more protected from the adult programming by section 505(a)
as it would section 504173 Indeed, similar arguments can be
made against the time channeling requirement of section
505(b), in that children would be free to view all the signal
bleed they desire if they are capable of staying up past 10:00
p.m., which is not an outlandish proposal in modern day
society. 14
Furthermore, the argument made by the Playboy II court
that section 504 is "an adjunct of lesser efficacy" because it
requires parents to take affirmative steps to block the signal
bleed is not very forceful. First, while the Playboy II court
faults MSOs and adult channel programmers for their lack of
advertising of the section 504 free voluntary blockage,
nowhere in the provision does it assign such duties to those
parties. 7 Second, it seems unreasonable for the court to
171. See id. at 756.
172. See id.
173. Stephen R. Effros, Content Regulation: Broadcast Signal Carriage and
Obscenity/Indecency-A Year of Preliminary Skirmishes Leading Up to the Final
Rounds, 470 PLI/PAT 7, 15, (1997).
174. It is not hard to imagine that in households where children have
televisions in their own bedrooms, or where parents work late or otherwise leave
their children unsupervised after 10 p.m., a child could still access the signal
bleed, even if the MSO was in compliance with section 505(b).
175. See Pub.L. No. 104-104, § 504, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (1996).
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expect evidence to be presented on the effectiveness of section
504 when that provision came into effect only as recently as
the rest of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.176
Finally, it is not nearly as clear as the court implies in
Playboy II that section 504 would not be a worthy alternative
to section 505. For example, the effort put forth by the parents
who sent letters to their congressmen complaining about
signal bleed could easily be channeled toward their own MSOs
in order to request a free lockbox installation. In such an
instance, both the parents would be satisfied in protecting
their children, and the MSOs and programmers would be
satisfied in only having to finance the blockage for those who
affirmatively desire it. Also, since the parents must have
contacted the MSO initially in order to subscribe to cable in
the first place, it does not seem unreasonable to have them
contact the MSO to address a perceived problem with their
service.
In Playboy IT the court acknowledged that cable
subscribers could be notified of the services available
proscribed under section 504 via inserts in program guides,
messages on monthly billing statements, advertisements on
other channels, and special mailings. 7 7 Yet, because no
evidence was presented of such notifications being made or
consumer response to them, the court concluded that section
504 could not be considered "a meaningful alternative" to
section 505."'178 However, in what can be interpreted as a
pinhole to exploit, Playboy Idid state that "[alt the time of the
permanent injunction hearing, further evidence of the actual
and predicted impact and efficacy of § 504 would be helpful to
U 179
us .
C. Common Sense Considerations
Perhaps the best accomplishment section of 505 makes is
illustrating just how irresponsible Senators can be in
attempting to appease their constituents. During her remarks
176. See Ad.
177. See945F.Supp. at 781.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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introducing the amendment that became section 505, Senator
Feinstein was quick to announce that "there are no uniform
laws or regulations that govern such sexually explicit adult
programming on cable television."18 ° While she did mention
that both the National Cable Television Association and the
California Cable Television Association had adopted voluntary
guidelines that recommended that local MSOs fully block
unwanted sexually explicit channels at no cost to the
consumer,18' she failed to acknowledge section 544(d)(2) of the
1984 Cable Act, which actually codifies as federal law those
voluntary guidelines. 82 Perhaps the Senate has no qualms
about passing redundant laws, but when those laws raise
potential violations of constitutional rights, the courts should
not ignore such actions.
Another element to consider in examining the Congress'
poor judgment in passing section 505 is whether or not
spending resources on the enforcement of such a law is
realistic. With the development and implementation of new
technologies, the phenomenon of signal bleed will soon
become non-existent. An example of such technology is the
direct broadcast satellite, which is not subject to section 505
or similar regulation.'83 Direct broadcast satellite systems
include such services as DirecTV, Primestar, and EchoStar
Communications.'84 MSOs lost over five percent of their
subscribers to such systems in 1996 alone.'85
Since direct satellite broadcast systems are not subject to
the regulation imposed by section 505, the effectiveness of the
statute in preventing children from being exposured to
sexually explicit programming is diminished. For example, a
household that subscribes to an MSO that complies with
section 505 will not subject its children to the signal bleed of
sexually explicit channels. However, those children would be
able to view the same sexually explicit programming at their
180. 141 CONG. REC. at S8167 (1995).
181. See id.
182. See supra Part II.C.
183. See Goldblatt, supra note 12, at 264.
184. SeeBIEDERMAN, supra note 26, at 631.
185. See HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 23, 1996, at 3.
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friends' home, if that household received direct broadcast
satellite service instead of cable. DirecTV, DISH Network, and
Primestar all have Playboy Television available 24 hours per
day, in addition to pay-per-view services and 24 hour
availability through the Galaxy 5, Transponder 2 of traditional
C-Band satellite dish service. 88
Currently, MSOs are also experimenting with new digital
cable service, an advanced technology that improves picture
and sound quality, as well as eliminates signal bleed. 187 The
Playboy II court noted that approximately 2 million
households already receive such service, and that MSOs will
most likely make the premium channels the first channels
they switch over to digital cable. 88 Upgrading traditional
coaxial cable to hybrid fiber-optic coaxial cable is estimated to
cost MSOs collectively close to $25 billion.'89 While such
expenditures make the money needed to comply with section
505 look like peanuts, it appears that forcing MSOs to comply
with section 505 will result in throwing money away. MSOs
will eliminate signal bleed when they switch to digital cable
service, and there is very little doubt that they will switch, as
it will be necessary for them to do so in order to compete with
the Direct Broadcast Satellite Systems and the entry of
telephone companies into the cable television market. 9 ° So,
perhaps Congress simply needed to be a bit more patient, as it
is apparent that signal bleed is a problem that will correct
itself in the not too distant future.
Lastly, there is also something to be said for allowing
signal bleed to remain unregulated for the good of society. In
his dissent in Pacifica, Justice Brennan wrote the following:
As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this
Court, some parents may actually find Mr. Carlin's
unabashed attitude towards the seven 'dirty words' healthy,
186. See I Want My Playboy TV, available at
<http://www.playboy.com/entertainment/pbtv/satinfo/index.html>, (last
visted June 14, 1999).
187. See id.
188. See Playboy H1, 945 F.Supp. at 780.
189. See Elizabeth Lesly, Cable TV: A Crisis Looms, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 14,
1996, at 101.
190. See id.
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and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner
in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding the
words. Such parents may constitute a minority of the
American public, but the absense of great numbers willing
to exercise the right to raise their children in this fashion
does not alter the right's nature or its existence. Only the
Court's regrettable decision does that. 191
While there is arguably a dramatic contrast between
allowing a child to listen to a monologue about dirty words,
and allowing a child to watch sexually explicit adult
programming, at some level there is a common theme shared
by both practices. Parents who wish to break down traditional
taboos associated with sexuality may not be so opposed to
allowing signal bleed to go unregulated. If anything, the
existence of signal bleed allows children of cable subscribers
to experience the rite of passage that generations of children
before them have experienced in the form of discovering their
sexuality through covert exposure to sexually explicit
literature, magazines, and videos. While Justice Brennan may
not have wished to have his reasoning extended to such an
extreme, the notion is worth considering when such parental
prerogatives are threatened by potentially unconstitutional
regulations.
V
Conclusion
Ultimately, section 505 should be found unconstitutional.
While the court in Playboy II found that the merits of such an
argument were unlikely to succeed, it is the reasoning found
in Playboy I that indicates the legislation may be found
unconstitutional.
While the Supreme Court may have affirmed Playboy H
without hearing the merits of the case, there is little doubt
that a true facial challenge to the constitutionality of section
505 will be brought in the near future. When that day comes,
hopefully the Court will find that there are less restrictive
ways than section 505 to protect children from the signal
191. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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bleed of sexually explicit adult programs. Only then will
section 505 finally be struck down as unconstitutional.
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